Speeches and Remarks 2007

Ambassador David C. Mulford
Telephonic Press Conference
July 30, 2007

( Audio)

Ambassador Mulford:   Good evening, everybody.  I'm very happy to have the chance to speak with you today.

I wanted to be available to the press a few days after the announcement of the 1-2-3 Agreement and the original press conferences so there would be time for you to digest your thoughts and so on, and if you had any lingering questions I'd be happy to try to deal with those today.

I do think it's important to go back a little bit and put the entire deal in perspective.  Everybody knows that it's two years and two days since the deal was first announced, but in fact it goes back further than that.  It goes back to the early part of 2005 because as you'll remember when Secretary Rice visited in March of '05, that was when the proposal was made to engage in this negotiation.  I've been involved in this process from the very beginning, right from the very beginning of the ideas, and so I remember very clearly the effect that that visit had, the excitement it created, and then it led to the negotiation which culminated in the July '05 visit by the Prime Minister to Washington. 

So again, one has to go back in time and remember the statement made by the President of the United States, namely that the United States wished to assist India in its desire to fulfill its vision to become a world power, and this judgment was coupled with the proposal that we should address what would appear to be one of India's most serious challenges as it sought to realize that vision, namely to address the energy situation in India on a very broad basis.  That is exactly what this proposal has done.

The reasons were, just to review those, first of all to address a real problem in India that would help India resolve its long-term challenge; and secondly, to address this major energy source, reduce India's dependence on outside energy, a clean source of energy, and so on.  So this launched what is, as we look back, one of the most complex negotiations ever conducted in fully transparent fashion by two major democracies with both the Congress and the Parliament consulted and involved and the media fully involved and informed at every stage.  And the outcome, of course, was never going to be perfect for all shades of opinion in each country, but the test is whether the outcome is broadly acceptable; and secondly, whether it is going to work as an agreement; and finally, whether it is the basis for a deepening strategic relationship between our two countries.

I think the answers to those questions are all yes.  And as I said in my Op-ed piece this morning, there are two future challenges.  One is to get the balance of the process accomplished; and secondly, to build immediately on the strategic relationship and begin to accomplish things between us as quickly as we can.

So I'd be happy to answer questions that anybody might have.  Thank you very much.

Seema Guha, DNA:  [New Delhi] Ambassador, how confident are you of getting the 1-2-3 Agreement passed in the U.S. Congress?

Ambassador Mulford:  I think we're confident that we can get it through Congress but there are certain considerations that need to be borne in mind.  One of those is the passage of time.  [Inaudible] before the Congress the easier it's going to be because next year we move fully into an election year.  This is probably going to make things somewhat more complex as the year goes on.  So we hope very much that we can recreate the strong bipartisan support that was enjoyed at the time the House and the Senate both acted on the legislation.  This would mean that we would hope that India would accomplish its IAEA Safeguards Agreement quickly, hopefully with a period of a month or two; then we move to the Nuclear Suppliers Group where that group is convened and gives a clean change of rules; and then we go to the Congress where there is a requirement that a certain number of congressional business days are supposed to pass before the vote takes place.  That is in the hands of the leadership, and our hope is that we could encourage the leadership to move that timetable quickly so that before too many months go by we actually get the vote.

Obviously that's probably the single most important consideration at this point in time.  I think there is broad bipartisan support for India, and I think this agreement, although it will have its critics, broadly will once again be supported.

Ranjit Kumar, Navbharat Times: [New Delhi] Ambassador, The possibility of a nuclear test by India remains a contentious issue between the two countries in case either Pakistan or China conducts a nuclear test and India also conducts a nuclear test in reaction; what will be the U.S.'s reaction to that?

Ambassador Mulford:  First if all, these are all speculative questions and I don't wish to engage in trying to answer who does what when somebody else has done something and so on.  The agreement is very clear.  It preserves the right of return which is required by U.S. law in this case.  The President would have the discretion to require the return of fuel and other nuclear equipment in such circumstances.  That has been clearly preserved in line with the Hyde Act.

India has itself declared that it does not intend to test.  It has its own self-declared moratorium.  I think if India decides to change that policy it understands that there would be political repercussions because we have our laws and they've acknowledged that, so I think they'd have to make that judgment on the basis of the situation at that time.

Ishani Dutta Roy, Anandabazar Patrika:  [Kolkata] Mr. Ambassador, actually [inaudible] the question of India's relation with Iran.  Mr. Nicholas Burns has just told a couple of [inaudible] that the U.S. would like to help India so that India will not need any energy from Iran.  So is that the reason in [inaudible] when you seek the nodding from the Congress?

Ambassador Mulford:  First of all, this agreement will permit India to develop its own nuclear, civil nuclear industry.  The negotiation on this agreement was entirely concerned with normalizing civil nuclear relations between the United States and India and also between India and the rest of the world, ending 30-some years of India's isolation.  The development of India's civil nuclear sector will be a matter for India to address, as well as the government, and I suppose also private industry. There will be heavy participation in this process by industries in the United States and in other countries.

In my opinion this will be one of the civil nuclear industry's [inaudible] and therefore it's a very, very big development for India's future.  I do not believe that India is considering using nuclear energy from Iran.  I don't believe that's on the agenda at all.  And Iran really didn't figure into these negotiations,  strictly speaking, on the civil nuclear industry of India. 

I think the only relevance of Iran here is that India's relationship with Iran will be very carefully reviewed and scrutinized by members of Congress as they approach the final vote on the 1-2-3 Agreement.  This is one of Congress' concerns, but the administration is supporting this agreement and supporting its passage through Congress.

So I believe that fully answers the question.

Manisha Singhal, DNA: [Mumbai] Sir, if the treaty emphasizes on the civil nuclear trade, who will be the major beneficiaries? And can you further clarify more on India's concessions?

Ambassador Mulford:  The most immediate beneficiary of the agreement is India, which as I said before, its isolation over the last 35 years comes to an end when this process is completed. It is brought into the non-proliferation system of the world on its present basis, and this is an extremely historic breakthrough for India.  It will also serve as the basis, as I said before, for a major civil nuclear industry development in India.  It will be, in my view, the largest in the world probably.

As to the concessions that were made, the whole point of the negotiation over the past two years has been to find the basis, a workable basis for both countries to recreate normalized civil nuclear relations.  This has involved compromises and concessions on both sides.  That's what these negotiations have been about.

There's been some very, very important concessions made by the United States, for example, one of which is the consent right for reprocessing.  India has made concessions on its side.

So by and large, that's the definition of a successful agreement and negotiation.

Kumar Chellappan, Deccan Chronicle:  [Chennai] Sir, in the supreme national interest, if India decides to go for a nuclear test, will the nuclear cooperation be with the donors for the Hyde Act?  And I would like to ask one more thing, will there be full civil nuclear cooperation which includes supply of technology, equipment, components and so on in the area of uranium and enrichment reprocessing of spent fuel and heavy water technology?

Ambassador Mulford:  Addressing the last part of your question first, I think the best thing is that you should consult the text when it's released, because these are very, very complex issues. The consent right for reprocessing is a major breakthrough for India.  It is something that we were able to agree by virtue of the fact that India proposed to create and designate a specific reprocessing facility which would reprocess safeguarded fuel under IAEA safeguards.  That basis of cooperation was enough to reach the agreement that we would grant the consent right and we now both have to engage in creating certain arrangements and procedures to bring that reprocessing activity to reality.

So I think that is a very, very important element.

As to the supply of nuclear technology, et cetera, that you referred to, that is an item that is dealt with under the Hyde Act.  There are a couple of exceptions there which are made available, and if India wishes to move in that direction it would be possible to seek one of those amendments to move forward.  But that was not one of the prime issues of the negotiation… 

[Interruption - loud beeping]

Ambassador Mulford:  U.S. law is very clear on this point.  As I said, the possibility remains open there on that issue.  And you should read the text of the agreement when it comes out.

As to the testing, testing by India was not dealt with in the agreement.  The law in the United States is very clear, and India knows what that law is.  The right of return, as I've said, has been preserved for the discretion in the event that something like that should happen.  So that is a futuristic event which I believe is very probable.  And there are efforts made in the agreement to conduct consultations and deal with these issues.

Srinjoy Chowdhury, Times Now: [New Delhi] Ambassador, how confident are you that China, which is a member of the NSG, will not veto the supply of fuel to India?

Ambassador Mulford:  Well, until now they haven't said anything along those lines, but we have committed with India to seek the consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and we will work that issue as soon and as aggressively as we can once the IAEA safeguards arrangements have been negotiated by India and the IAEA.

Our consultations up until this time show that the NSG in general is favorable to this agreement, but of course they're going to want, like everybody else, to look at the agreement itself and reflect on it.  But we're confident that we can move this forward.

Aditi Phadnis, Business Standard: [New Delhi] My question is you were there throughout the negotiations.  The negotiations took two extra days to complete. Were there times during the negotiations when you felt like knocking a couple of heads?  Were there people who walked out?  Just tell us some of the stories there.

Ambassador Mulford:  I've been present in all of the negotiations right back to the beginning, including those that took place in Washington at the time of the Prime Minster's visit, those that took place in New Delhi at the time of the President's visit, and all subsequent negotiations except a couple of contact points in Washington when I was still in Delhi.  But for the most part I've been present at all the negotiating sessions.

At all times the atmosphere was friendly and constructive.  Obviously there were periods when there was a certain frustration on both sides by virtue of the fact that it was taking a very long time and a lot of effort to work through this material.  But I think everybody realized at the same time that we were dealing with something that was highly complex technically, and very, very politically sensitive on both sides.  We were making a new path, as it were, in the non-proliferation architecture of the world, and therefore this was an extremely delicate and complex process.

So I would say during these negotiations at all times there was good will and good humor and earnest and good faith negotiations going on.  Obviously both parties negotiated with strength and conviction so it wasn't always easy. 

I think the most difficult time probably was the period late May/June at the time of Mr. Burns' last visit to India because that was the time when the final bottom line on both sides really began to be visible, and we could sort of get a feel for what was really going to break the deal or not.  Therefore when we convened in July after a certain amount of preparation on both sides, we both knew, both sides knew that this was the time to conclude the deal because if we didn't then there was some likelihood that the deal would languish.

So we engaged, as you know, very fully, senior people empowered to reach an agreement on both sides.  The meetings were again, friendly.  They took time.  Not really because of any particular antagonism or difficulty along that line, but because the final problems that had to be resolved were very, very complex and they took repeated efforts at language and concepts and so on to reach the final workable arrangement.

I don't recall at any time that anybody walked out in a huff or that there was any strong feelings beyond one or two points where people said look, this is something we just have to have.  But that's a sort of bottom-line discussion.  It's not unfriendly.  It's just the nature of a very difficult negotiation.

So all in all, I would say the entire process was conducted in a state of friendly and constructive engagement.  I think this agreement really is historic for both of us, and for the world incidentally.  It is an agreement that fits within the international architecture but has modified the position for India in a unique way on a one-time basis and will, as I've said, generate a unique future for India.  And incidentally, serve in my view as the basis for a deepening strategic relationship between the United States and India.

Parul Malhotra, CNN-IBN: [New Delhi] As you know, the text of the agreement has not been made public as yet, but in the case of a test we're made to understand that the U.S. will help India source alternative fuel supplies from other countries before it takes back its fuel, material, technology, et cetera.  Could you confirm that for us? That's one.

Second, is there a distinction in the way that the U.S. will react in the scenario that India tests voluntarily versus India tests say after an American test?  Is there a distinction in the way the U.S. would react to these scenarios, sir?

Ambassador Mulford:  Well, as I said before, one has to go back to the point that the testing issue is not mentioned in this agreement.  This was a civil nuclear agreement, exclusively concerned with India's civil nuclear industry.  It was not a negotiation over India's strategic nuclear capabilities.  And that was the case from day one, and that was carried through the entire negotiation.

As I said before, there is U.S. law on this matter and the U.S. law was observed and accepted by India as something that was not going to change.  The right of return, as I've explained before, which is a discretionary right the President has under certain circumstances, has been preserved.

The question of what happens "if" is purely speculative.  It's impossible to lay out in any very concrete way what might happen; the circumstances that might bring about a situation of the type that you asked about.  We are assuming and operating on the basis that that situation will not occur, and that India's commitment to its unilaterally declared moratorium on testing will hold up.  And that this is a problem we won't have to face.

But as you noticed and as you will see in the agreement, there were certain assurances provided by the President in negotiation actually with the Prime Minister back in March of '06, when the four points were laid out with regard to assurances on the supply of fuel.  Those have been incorporated word for word in the agreement, so you will see those there.  They will be laid out very very clearly.

The United States has indicated a willingness to help India create a strategic fuel reserve and in that reserve the U.S. fuel might conceivably be recallable, but fuel from other sources would not be, for example.

So the United States delineated this position very, very carefully.  We also pledged to engage other countries in the supply business under certain circumstances to assist in the continuation and continuity of supply.

So I think you'll find there that the arrangements are pretty concrete and they're based really on principles and not on a particular event which nobody can foresee.  So in my judgment, India has come out of this with a very, very secure position and it will have to be India's judgment as to whether or not that's adequate.  In the negotiation it was judged to be so, and it's been accepted by the Government of India, and therefore, I'm assuming that this is a workable proposition and we will all abide by it.

Kumar Chellappan, Deccan Chronicle:  [Chennai] I missed the answer on my first question on testing, if India conducts a nuclear test what will happen to the deal?  And another question I would like to ask is, why United States and India have deliberately come to an understanding not to make public the text of the 1-2-3 Agreement? Do you have anything to hide? 

Ambassador Mulford:  The public release of the text is something that was agreed in Washington, that we would freeze the text for the time being and that we would agree on the subsequent announcement which we've done and made, and on the release of the text.  The text will be released when both governments have decided it is the appropriate time.

On the Indian side, I think their concern is they would like to release the text to the Parliament. When they decide to do that I think is not fully decided, but my guess is it will be very, very soon.  And on the U.S. side, we will release the text when India releases the text.  Because we are not at this moment under a compulsion to release the text because we do not have legislation put before the Congress.  So the text will be released in both capitals at the time agreed, and I suspect that will be a matter of a few days.  And there is nothing to hide as a result of this at all.

Smita Sharma, IBN7: [New Delhi] Mr. Ambassador, any update on the possible visit of the Secretary of State?

Ambassador Mulford:  No.  I think she very much wants to visit, but is really thinking about sometime this autumn, but there is no date set at this time.